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e. 
EXPLANATORY STATE"ENT-
1. During 1982, the Commission of the European Communities formulated a 
proposal for a Council decision aimed at adopting new provisions relating 
to Chapter VI "Supplies" of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community. (Doe. COM (82> 732 final - Doe. 1-1164/82>. 
2. In connection with the work of the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology of the European Parliament, the rapporteur was instructed to 
analyse the above-mentioned proposal and reach conclusions on the 
advisability of carrying out a revision of chapter VI as proposed by the 
Commission. 
3. The rapporteur carried out this analysis during the first few months of 
1983 and it was summarized in the draft report of 18 May 1983 -
Doe. No. PE 84.748 B <attached). 
4. The conclusions drawn by the rapporteur in· his analysis lead to a negative 
assessment of the Commission's proposal from both the political and 
technical points of view. 
5. A special working party within the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology, with the rapporteur as chairman,·carried out further 
investigations on the Commission's proposal, with the particular aim of 
ascertaining the position of the most representative operators in the 
energy field in the ~ember States with regard to the said proposal. 
6. For this purpose a public hearing was held in Strasbourg on 24 January 
1984 in which many representatives of public bodies and industries 
operating in the field of energy supply in general and nuclear energy in 
particular in Member States were invited to take part. 
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7. Although their approaches to the problem varied, reflecting the sometimes 
considerable dissimilarities between Member States as regards energy 
situation, nuclear development, availability of uranium resources and the 
industrial scale of activities in the sector of nuclear fuel cycles, the 
participants at the hearing expressed an almost unanimous conviction that 
the changes to chapter VI outlined in the Commission's proposal were not 
desirable. 
8. Most industrial operators saw as a positive aspect the fact that one of 
the intentions of the proposed revision is to confirm Legally a de facto 
principle which had Long since been adopted, namely the abolition of the 
Agency's monopoly. Although such a positive result has been achieved in 
theory, a series of measures have been introduced, on the practical level, 
in the new system proposed for chapter VI, which will increase the 
workload of industries and make suppli in the nuclear sector as a whole 
more difficult. 
9. Following both the studies carried out by the working party in the 
Committee on Energy, Research and Technology of the European Parliament 
and the results emerging from the above-mentioned public hearing with 
operators from Member States, the rapporteur feels he must confirm the 
negative assessment of the Commission's proposal, emphasizing the main 
conclusions: 
from the political point of view, the Commission's proposal weakens the 
image of Community solidarity and goes against the European Parliament's 
aim of achieving greater European integration, 
from the technical point of view, the proposed outline for chapter VI 
seems unnecessarily cumbersome and punitive, since it creates more 
difficulties for the industries operating in the sector of nuclear fuel 
cycles than they are able to solve. 
10. The rapporteur thus proposes that the Commission's proposal should be 
shelved, pending reconsideration of the matter when the possibility of 
revising Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty on the basis of work carried out 
so far is tackled by the European Parliament after the elections next June 
in connection with the general question of the European Union. 
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ANNEX I 
wORKING DOCUMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The Euratom Treaty was signed in 1957, at a time when nuclear energy was 
still in its experimental phase. Nevertheless, as the Suez crisis <1956) 
coincided with the drawing up of the Treaty, its authors foresaw and gave 
clear emphasis to the vulnerability of Europe's oil imports. 
At that time, nuclear energy already appeared to be a serious alternative 
to oil. 
2. Because of the particularly unfavourable situation as far as conventional 
fuel supplies were concerned, the years immediately following the establishment 
of the Community were expected to see a period of severe shortage of 
conventional fuels, and also, on the basis of the data known at the time, a 
scarcity of uranium in the world. 
3. The preconditions for confronting the 'nuclear challenge', as expounded 
in the famous Three Wise Men report (1957), were Large-scale technological 
and industrial progress and a more or less guaranteed access to the necessary 
raw material, uranium • 
Hence the need to guarantee equal access to nuclear fuels for each 
country on the basis of its real energy requirements and regardless of whether 
or not uraniferous minerals were available in that country. 
4. However, th€ shortage of nuclear fuels anticipated at the time of the 
signing of the Treaty in 1957 never materialized and, as a result, some of 
the provisions of Chapter VI have never been applied, although continual 
efforts have been made by the EEC and by its Supply Agency to retain the 
provisions of the Treaty in force, at Least on a formal basis. 
5. The proposals to revise Chapter VI, put forward at the request of the 
French in 1964 and 1970 in order to bring it closer into line with 
established practice and new requirements, were not adopted by the Council. 
In other words, although the provisions of Chapter VI were widely disregarded 
in practice, it was always preferred not to tamper with the Treaty. 
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II. REMARKS ON THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL 
6. Article 2 of the Euratom Treaty, and in particular Letters (d) and (g) 
thereof, Lays down the principle that it is the duty of the Community to: 
- ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable 
supply of ores and nuclear fuels; 
-ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities 
by the creation of a common market in specialized materials and equipment. 
7. Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty Lays down the procedures to be followed 
by the Community in order to comply with this principle. 
The Euratom Supply Agency is responsible for helping the Commission 
to implement these procedures. 
8. The fundamental precept contained in the provisions of Chapter VI, as 
they now stand, is that of the commercial monopoly of the Supply Agency. 
9. The proposal for a revision submitted by the Commission is intended 
to provide a solution which satisfies the following two requirements: 
-on the one hand, to enable the Community to continue to accomplish the 
task assigned to it under Article 2 of the Treaty; 
-on the other, to bring the functioning of the Agency into Line with 
market requirements and the new conditions which have evolved. 
10. To meet these requirements, the proposal for a revision of Chapter VI 
put forward by the Commission provides for the Community's action to be 
based on the following fundamental principles: 
- ensuring the unity of the Community market 
- maintaining the Community's powers in the field of international relations 
- reserving the right to take specific solidarity measures 
- using the Supply Agency to implement the provisions of the new Chapter VI 
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-establishing an effective system of controls 
III. MAIN CRITICISMS 
11. The Commission's proposal to amend extensively the current rules of 
Chapter VI, one of the most important chapters of the Euratom Treaty, 
prompts the following considerations and comments (see also the table in 
Annex I showing the existing rules and proposed changes). 
12. The Commission's efforts to change the present system and lay down new 
guiding principles for the supply of nuclear materials, capable of meeting 
the different requirements of the Community countries, are highly commendable. 
13. Nevertheless, the impression obtained is that priority has been given 
to the interests of the most powerful nuclear countries. The proposal confines 
itself to laying down theoretical principles, the implementation of which would, 
once again, be left to the Commission itself, with no guarantee that this would 
be done in the desired time and manner. 
14. The Commission has started from the principle that the new provisions 
should, on the one hand, leave industry the widest possible margin of freedom 
to fulfil its industrial function to the full, but, on the other, provide all 
the necessary guarantees to prevent the actions of the Member States and the 
operators from compromising the regular and equitable supply of all users 
without discrimination. 
15. Careful consideration should therefore be given to the advisability of 
replacing the present rules which - theoretically - offer adequate protection 
to the weaker nuclear states (which can always invoke these ~rovisions in the 
event of a crisis in the sector), by other principles, equally theoretical in 
nature, which do not however appear to contain the same guarantees. 
16. In the opinion of the rapporteur, it would therefore be advisable to make 
agreement to these proposals conditional on the simultaneous presentation and 
adoption of secondary legislation, particularly the regulations on stockbuilding 
and Community aid in this field, possible exceptions to the principle of market 
unity, the Supply Agency, penalties and sanctions for infringements, and measures 
to redress market imbalances. 
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17. This would make it possible to make a thorough assessment - in practical 
terms - of the value for Europe of introducing a new Community mechanism to 
regulate the supply of nuclear materials. 
18. Furthermore, it has always been maintained that a united front of energy 
consumers could provide a more effective counterpart to the oil and gas 
producing countries. 
The Euratom Supply Agency - in its present institutional structure -
is a model which can be used as a basis for wider intervention in the energy 
sector (for example, in the field of oil supplies>. 
19. To weaken its role, as the revision of Chapter VI proposes, would not 
only be a setback to Community policy in the nuclear sector, but would also 
mean the loss of a platform for launching a more incisive Community policy in 
the energy sector as a whole (the International Energy Agency, of which France 
is not a member and which includes in its ranks a producer of the strength of 
the USA, demonstrably fails to represent the interests of the Community). 
20. The revision is based on the notion that the nuclear industry, which has 
changed considerably since 1957, should face no obstacles to its autonomous 
development. 
In reality, the development of the nuclear industry concerns only a small 
number of Community countries and there is no doubt that the elimination of 
the Agency's 'monopoly' would facilitate the transformation of the existing 
monopoly in the nuclear fuel cycle sector into a legal one. 
21. In fact, the proposed amendments would introduce discrimination between 
those countries which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not. The 
proposed amendment to Chapter VI specifies that the provisions concerned shall 
apply only to materials intended for civil and non-explosive purposes (Art. 52). 
Supplies destined for explosive uses in the civil field, however, are not 
covered by the provisions. 
22. It is this initial consideration which makes it clear that the principle 
of market unity is not being respected. 
Furthermore, discrimination of this kind infringes both the letter and 
the spirit of the Euratom Treaty. 
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23. The principle of the unity of the Community market is further jeopardized 
by the fact that provision is made for the rules governing the transfer of 
materials within the Community to be Laid down by the Commission <and not by 
the Council). 
24. In addition, amendments to these rules- if unilaterally requested by 
one Member State- may be adopted by the Council acting by a 'qualified 
majority' and not unanimously (Art. 53>, thereby introducing discrimination 
or facilitating the establishment of 'cartels'. 
25. The proposed provisions concerning transfers within or outside the 
Community <Art. 57> seem needlessly harsh as these transfers involve treated 
or processed materials for return to the original person or undertaking. 
Under the rules in force, such transfers are exempt from the prior approval 
of the Commission. 
26. The proposed rules may have two consequences: 
- if they wish to operate within the Community, the Community industries will 
not have a large turnover <which will affect their development>; 
- the Community industries which want to ensure an adequate turnover may prefer 
to operate outside the Community <which will affect employment and the 
strength of the Community). 
27. The proposed provisions will therefore harm the development of the 
nuclear industry as a whole. In addition, the trend of the provisions is 
towards greater Community intervention, which would depend for balance 
on the impartiality of the Commission. 
28. The proposed provisions concerning Community solidarity (Article 60-61) 
seem to be no more than statements of principle. They ought to be formulated 
in such a way as to provide an effective guarantee, to offset the hardship 
suffered by the weaker nuclear countries as a result of the elimination of 
the Agency's monopoly. 
29. Controls which appear redundant are to remain in force, supplemented by 
others to be enforced by the Community itself and the IAEA. The proposal 
for a revision does not appear to take account of the fact that, as far as 
controls and safeguards are concerned, the situation has evolved greatly since 1957. 
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IV. SPECIFIC REMARKS 
30. The proposed new text for Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty consists 
of 25 articles (from Article 52 to Article 76), as opposed to the 55 articles 
of the text currently in force (from Article 52 to Article 106). Below are 
a number of more specific remarks on those articles of the proposed text 
which seem most open to criticism. 
Article 52 
31. The former Article 52 lays down two principles: 
- the Agency should have a monopoly 
- there should be no discrimination between users. 
32. In the first place, the first part of the new text of Article 52 does 
not appear to be consistent with what follows: it states that 'the Community 
shall ensure that all users receive a regular and equitable supply ••• '. 
In subsequent articles, however, it is proposed to reduce the Community's 
powers to a level which would certainly not allow it to perform such an 
ambitious task. 
33. In view of the contents of Article 53, it would be more correct to talk 
of the Community regulating the supply rather than 'ensuring' it. 
34. In addition, the new text of Article 52 not only fails to mention the 
need to avoid discrimination, but it actually creates the principle of 
discrimination by affirming that the Community's action should apply only 
to materials intended for 'civil and non-explosive purposes'. It is clear 
that Community countries such as France and the United Kingdom, which possess 
nuclear weapons, will be able to enjoy a privileged market. 
35. On the one hand, material produced by these countries and supplied for 
explosive uses in the civil field will not be subject to the provisions of 
Chapter VI. In addition, all the materials produced and marketed will not be 
covered by these rules since they are not unequivocally earmarked for civil 
purposes. In other words, there is nothing to prevent a material initially 
designated as for 'military or explosive use' from being released onto the 
civil market. 
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Article 53 
36. The replacement of the principle of non-discrimination by that of the 
unity of the market can be endorsed, because it includes a general prohibition 
of all restrictions on the transfer, use and storage of nuclear materials. 
37. In order to make it fully operative and to ensure and guarantee effective 
equality of treatment for operators, it would still be necessary to stipulate 
that there can be no exceptions to this new principle. 
38. The Commission's proposal to allow derogations to be introduced at 
Community Level cannot therefore be endorsed. The Commission's justification 
for this approach (see the explanatory report, SECC82) 2161) is not convincing, 
since specific and suitable guarantees are provided by other instruments 
(Euratom -IAEA agreements, international agreements) in respect of control by 
public authorities.and any concerns which may be felt by external suppliers. 
Commercial or industrial requirements, also cited by the Commission as a 
justification for its proposal, cannot be justified since they are in sharp 
contrast with the principle of market unity (free movement of nuclear materials) 
which the proposal seeks to establish. 
39. It would therefore seem advisable to delete paragraph 2 of this article or 
to amend it extensively. 
40. It should first be noted that the proposed text (see OJ No. C 330, 
16.12.1982) is not absolutely clear in defining the procedure, since it 
refers to requests made by a Member State to which the Commission is required 
to reply within three months, but without specifying what the purpose of such 
requests should be or whether they would be actions taken in response to the 
rules to be introduced by the Commission. 
41. Secondly, the proposal contains a single mechanism for Legislation (a 
Commission regulation with the possibility of an appeal to the Council), for 
which there is no basis in the Community Treaties and whose Legitimacy should 
be closely examined. 
42. In substance, this article says that the 'new' power which the Community 
will have will depend on the contents of a regulation which does not yet 
exist and for which no precise deadline is set. 
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43. It is therefore vital to know the contents of this regulation before 
the proposed new Chapter VI can be approved. In addition: 
- it should be the task of the Council to adopt the regulation. The new 
t~xt assigns to the Commission the power to adopt the contents of the 
regulation and thus to determine the scope of the Community's action on 
nuclear supplies; 
- any action initiated by a Member State to repeal the regulation should be 
concluded by a unanimous decision of the Council and not by a decision 
'by a qualified majority' as provided in the new text. The purpose of this 
would be to prevent the establishment of 'cartels' of countries seeking to 
introduce discriminatory conditions by means of the regulation; 
the possibility of using the regulation to allow exceptions to the 
principle of market unity, which is what the Commission intends 
<explanatory report SEC<82) 2161 of 17 December 1982), should be ruled 
out from the outset. This would render meaningless the principle of 
'market unity' which the proposal seeks to introduce in place of the 
existing principle of 'non-discrimination'. 
44. Precisely because this is a fundamental principle which should govern 
the regulation of nuclear supplies, the Legal power to decide on exceptions 
should Lie only with the Council and should be exercised for the first time 
in conjunction with the adoption of the amendments to Chapter VI. 
45. This would make it possible to evaluate the exact scope of the new 
principle and thus assess the true value of the adoption of this new system 
as far as operators are concerned. 
Article 54 
46. Because of the very special nature of the nuclear sector, with its 
specific energy and strategic characteristics, the rules on competition 
contained in the EEC Treaty cannot be applied to the new supplies system. 
The nuclear sector is already subject to so many constraints and 
controls that there is clearly no need to introduce additional ones of 
the kind provided for in the rules on competition. 
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47. Furthermore, there is no justification for applying the competition 
rules of the EEC Treaty to the nuclear sector, either from a Legal, or 
still Less, from a practical point of view. 
48. Indeed, the Commission's interpretation that, by virtue of Article 232 
of the EEC Treaty, the rules on competition are generally applicable to the 
nuclear sector except where otherwise provided, is open to doubt. On the 
contrary, by virtue of Article 232 of the EEC Treaty, Euratom rules take 
precedence over EEC rules even in matters relating to competition. 
49. If the Commission can cite the special nature of the nuclear sector as 
justification for drawing up a new and specific system for supplies, it is 
difficult to see why it should not do likewise with regard to competition. 
The very nature of the nuclear sector, with its strategic importance in 
terms of energy, makes it impossible to apply rules, such as those on 
competition, ~hich have been defined and developed for industrial sectors 
with very different characteristics and requirements. 
50. Rules on competition can be justified in a free market, where there 
are a variety of operators and a need to ensure the free movement of goods-
conditions which do not prevail in the nuclear sector. The movement of 
nuclear materials is already subject to so many constraints and controls 
that it seems inappropriate to introduce new ones, even in a formal area 
such as competition <cf. the aims referred to by the Commission in its 
remarks in the abovementioned explanatory report, particularly Articles 72 
and 74). 
51. In addition, the application of these rules to the nuclear sector 
would involve, in practice, the application of secondary Legislation 
deriving from Articles 85 <agreements between undertakings) and 90 
(transparency of financial dealings between public undertakings and Member 
States), which would have significant effects. In the first instance, the 
implementation of agreements between suppliers and producers would be 
dependent in practice on the opinion of the competition services, with no 
deadline set for the delivery of this opinion. 
52. It would therefore be appropriate to delete Article 54 and retain the 
provisions on competition policy contained in the present Chapter VI. 
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ArticLe 55
53. The experience gained in the
Commission shows the need to find
protection of the Member States'
jnternat iona I agreements
a procedure which attows
interests.
conc[uded by the
effect i ve
The sed rsl0n shou Ld therefore be amended so as to define
the rote, tasks and sit ion of the speciaI commi ttee s sted b
the Commission.
54. The reference to the s'imiLar committees provided for in Articte 113
of the EEC Treaty, uhich the Commission uses as justification for this
provision, is inadequate for this purpose.
0n the contrary, it is necessary to ensure that this committee
participates effectiveIy in the negotiations and to provide for the
possibitity of submitting a report/opinion to the CounciL, which forms
an integraL part of the adoption procedure laid down by the second
paragraph of ArtjcLe 101.
ArticLe 57
55. The Commission has used the present ArticLe 59 of Chapter VI as the
basis for this prov'ision, which stiputates that aLI exports of nucLear
materiats sha[ [ requi re the authorization of the commission.
As it stands, this articIe woutd assign to the Commission substantiaI
powers to intervene and impose conditions iri the export sector, to the
detriment of the'industries operating.in the nucIear fueI cycte. This
wouLd extend the requirement for prior approvat by the Commission to exports
of materiats processed for a pei^son or undertaking from a third country,
whereas the originat text (Articte 75) exempted them from this requirement.
56. It is ctear that a strict appLication of this new articte coutd:
d'issuade cIients:n third ccr.rntries fronl using the Community,s processing
industries, for feer that cenditions impcsed by the Comrnission and not
known beforehand couLd create difficul.ties for the return of the materiats;
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- encourage Community industries to exploit their production capacity in 
third countries so as to enjoy maximum freedom of action; 
- dissuade other countries from participating in nuclear development in 
the Community (for example, the Leasing of materials and services for 
the fuel cycle>, for fear of seeing the object of the transaction 
'frozen' in the Community. 
57. Under the present rules the need for authorizations derives - as the 
Commission points out - rather from the need to guarantee the general 
interests of the Community than from the existence of the Agency's monopoly, 
although it is true that special fissile materials are exempt from this, as 
are the commitments referred to in Article 75, which are not covered by the 
monopoly. 
58. Once the Agency's monopoly is broken, there is therefore no need for 
a control of this kind on exports. Particularly as this would have the 
effect of creating, for no good reason, a disparity between the treatment 
of exports and that of imports, for which, under the new rules, only 
subsequent notificiation would have to be given. 
59. This provision should therefore be deleted and provision should be 
made for the rules Laid down in Articles 66 and 72 to apply also to export 
contracts. 
Article 58 
60. The industries of the Member States need to be reassured as to the 
Community's intention to support common projects. As it stands, however, 
Article 58 would only be a source of concern for these industries, because: 
it explicitly requires them to provide information about investment 
projects and this could undermine industrial confidentiality; 
- it gives an extremely general idea of what the Community's aid would be. 
Article 60 
61. This article lays down the possible action the Council may take to build 
up stocks (it would be preferable to replace 'may decide' by 'shall decide'). 
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62. The decisions on stocks and on possible Community aid are of the 
utmost importance. 
Firm commitments are therefore required by the Community in this 
field. The provision proposed by the Commission, however, does not seem 
to offer adequate guarantees in this respect. It should also be noted 
that, in the Commission's proposal, the adoption of these measures is 
purely hypothetical and no provision is made to compel the Council to act 
on this matter. 
63. It would therefore be appropriate to amend this article so as to oblige 
the Council to act on the initiative of the Commission or at the request of 
a Member State and to adopt the decisions on this matter unanimously. In 
addition, procedures should be established for the use of the stocks at the 
same time as the adoption of the amendment. 
Article 61 
64. It is difficult to see how the elimination of the Agency's monopoly 
can be reconciled with the contents of this article, which, in substance, 
would allow the Council to take action on prices and imports on the basis 
of its own evaluation of the balance between supply and demand, without 
taking account of industrial strategies. 
65. The remarks made in connection with the previous article also apply 
to this one. 
In particular, it does not seem right to adopt by a qualified 
majority provisions which are intended to remedy the imbalance between 
supply and demand by means of measures to diversify the sources of supply 
and to give Community preference to producers from the Member States. 
66. Here again, the Council ought to decide on a request from a Member 
State or on the initiative of the Commission. 
Article 62 
67. The introduction of the amendments proposed to the previous article 
and the fact that the measures it suggests are only guidelines, make this 
article redundant. 
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It should therefore be deleted. 
Article 65 
68. Despite its modified functions, the Agency would be a Community organ 
and, under new Article 52, would be assigned the essential task of contributing 
to the implementation of the supplies policy. 
In view of the above consideration, the Agency should be financed from 
the general budget of the Community, while maintaining its financial 
autonomy. However, the part of the article which seeks to fix a charge on 
transactions and to control the formation of the Agency's capital - which 
would be open, moreover, to third countries - is unacceptable. It would 
therefore be appropriate to delete the second and third indents of the 
first paragraph of this article. 
Article 66 
69. In conformity with the remarks made in connection with Article 57, it 
is necessary to propose an amendment to this article to the effect that the 
Agency should also be informed of export contracts. 
Article 69 
70. In the frequently referred to explanatory report which accompanies its 
proposal, the Commission specifies that the Agency may conclude contracts 
not only when provision to this effect is made in international agreements 
but also under the circumstances provided for in Articles 62 and 63 <imbalance 
between supply and demand). 
Article 70 
71. It would be necessary to know the contents of the Commission regulation 
establishing the procedure for applying Section IV, the Supply Agency, <see 
Art. 71) before defining what information the Member States should make 
available to the Agency. 
Article 72 
73. The Commission is proposing post facto communication of contracts because 
it believes this will avoid obstacles and delays. 
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74. However, the Commission's interpretation cannot be accepted, as the 
proposal includes a provision subjecting the contracts to a suspending 
condition in conformity with the rules of Chapter VI. 
This condition could impede the conclusion of contracts for immediate 
implementation which - in the event of irregularity - could be declared 
null and void, with the inevitable Legal and economic consequences for the 
obligations incurred during the time Limit Laid down by the Commission (in 
total, 45 days for the Commission to give its ruling). 
75. In fact, as far as operators are concerned, the form of the communication 
(prior or post facto) is Less important than the exact scope of the field of 
inquiry allowed to the Commission. 
76. It would therefore be appropriate to amend this article so as to: 
- indicate clearly what form the Agency's verification should take; 
- extend this verification to include export contracts <see remarks on 
Art. 57>; 
- in cases of post facto communication, provide for partial annulment, 
to allow exemption for any effects produced by the contract pending 
the Commission's ruling. 
Article 73 
77. This article provides for the possibility of Community controls over 
persons and undertakings which seem excessive and, in any case, redundant 
given the competent controls already in operation (Luxembourg security 
control, IAEA controls, national controls). 
78. The power granted to Commission officials, particularly in respect of 
access to premises, sites and means of transport, should be confined to 
the controls they require to exercise in order to verify whether contracts 
comply with the rules in force. 
79. There is in fact a danger that these controls could overlap with the 
security controls performed by the appropriate services, but without the 
specific guarantees provided for the latter (Articles 81 and 82). 
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80. Since the Commission specifies in its explanatory report that the 
aim of the controls relates to the communication of contracts or the 
failure to do so, it would be appropriate to amend this article in such 
a way as to make explicit the object of the required verifications and to 
limit the powers of the Commission's representatives accordingly. 
Article 74 
81. The possibility of applying fines and/or penalties is an essential 
element of the new Chapter VI. 
The proposal to grant the Commission legal authority in this field 
is puzzling, not only ,because of the importance of the subject, but also 
because the new rules -as the Commission itself affirms in its explanatory 
report - should also apply to infringements of international agreements 
<new Article 55). 
82. It is therefore necessary, on the basis of the contents of this 
article, for the new control system, under the jurisdiction of the Council 
of Ministers, to enter into force at the same time as the new supplies 
system. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
83. In the opinion of the rapporteur, the proposal for a revision submitted 
by the Commission is politically inopportune and unacceptable, because it 
would weaken the image of Community solidarity (it is not enough to say that 
the Agency would not function according to the Statutes) and goes against 
the trend towards greater European integration which the European Parliament 
has so far followed (resolutions of 9 July 1981 and 6 July 1982, setting up 
a Committee on Institutional Affairs with the task of drawing up a draft 
treaty for European Union). 
84. Secondly, as we have tried to show in the present document, the 
proposal is technically deficient, because it creates more difficulties 
than it solves. If the functioning of the Agency was already complex, the 
amendments proposed by the Commission would render it still more so. 
85. In the rapporteur's view, the revision would be Likely to give public 
opinion - which already has valid .reasons for concern - the impression of 
an uncommitted, laissez-faire approach by the Community. 
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86. In this respect, there are serious risks because of the absence of 
one of the guarantees which are for the moment formal, but which should 
be essential for safely extending the u·se of nuclear energy and for 
reassuring public opinion in its acceptance of it. 
87. In conclusion, the rapporteur takes the view that, in addition to 
the need to construct a united Europe, there is also the very important 
matter of public opinion, which is increasingly calling for fresh 
guarantees before it will accept the siting of nuclear power stations. 
To accept this proposal would be to betray those expectations. 
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Chapter VI - Proposed revision 
ANNEX II I 
' ----------------------------------------r--------------------------------r--------------------------------~-----------------------------'t 
TEXT IN FORCE 
-----------t---------~ 
ARTICLE 
Art. 52 
I 
N 
o-
1 
SUBJECT 
Principle of the 
monopoly of the 
Agency 
Principle of non-
discrimination 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION PROPOSED TEXT 
This principle has been avoided This principle is abolished. 
in practice by means of free 
negotiation - a practice 
subsequently endorsed by the 
Agency 
This principle has been 
respected by the Agency 
Provision is made instead for 
the Community to ensure regular 
and-equitable supplies 
Community action should only 
concern materials intended 
for 'civil and non-explosive 
purposes' 
REMARKS 
Given the nature of the 
full proposed text, the 
Community can, at most, 
regulate rather than ensure 
supplies 
The new text establishes 
the principle of discrimination 
in favour of countries with 
nuclear weapons: 
• with regard to materials I 
intended for explosive uses, ; 
countries with nuclear 
weapons will enjoy a 
privileged market, not 
subject to regulation by 
the Community; 
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ARTICLE 
Articles 53 
to 56 
57 to 66 
TEXT IN FORCE 
SUBJECT 
Role of the 
Agency 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
The Agency has certainly not 
been allowed - by any of the 
Member States - to fulfil its 
most important task, i.e. the 
'right of option' 
Right of option on Rarely exercised 
all materials 
coming from inside 
the Community 
PROPOSED TEXT REMARKS 
• there is nothing to prevent 
materials initially ear-
marked for explosive uses -
and thus exempt from 
Community regulation -
from being released onto 
the civil market 
The new text <Articles 64 to 71> The new text confirms the 
is based on the principle of 'academic' role of the 
abolishing the Agency's monopoly Agency. The respect of the 
and right of option old text would create many 
problems so far evaded, if 
it became binding. 
Abolished Abolishing this principle 
will deprive the Agency of 
its potential role as a 
powerful protector of the 
weaker countries. The 
natural consequence will 
be the creation of special 
relationships between the 
stronger countries. 
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TEXT IN FORCE 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION PROPOSED TEXT REMARKS 
ARTICLE SUBJECT 
------------------~----------------~------------------------------~------------------------------~-----------------------------' 
67 to 69 
Art. 70 
I 
IV 
00 
I 
Art. 71 
Art. 72 
Prices policy 
Prospecting pro-
grammes in the 
Member States 
Never implemented 
Occasionally implemented 
Recommendations on Respected 
revenue or mining 
regulations 
Building up of 
stocks 
Never applied 
Provision is made (Art. 61> for Council intervention could 
the possibility of intervention- affect industrial strategies 
by means of a Council decision by 
a qualified majority - in the 
event of an imbalance between 
supply and demand 
The new text reaffirms in 
briefer and more realistic 
terms the contents of the 
article, adapting them to take 
account of the abolition of the 
principle of equal access 
Not mentioned 
None 
Uninfluential 
In this area, a more binding 
policy on stocks was intended 
: l 
I! 
... 
I 
Same general formulation as the 
~ld text, with mention of the 
~eed for prior consultation of 
~he Assembly <Art. 60> 
to provide partial compensation'. 
for the weaker nuclear countries 
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ARTICLE 
Art. 74 
Art. 75 
I 
N 
..0 
I 
Art. 76 
TEXT IN FORCE 
SUBJECT 
Exemption for 
materials used 
for research 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Applied 
Exemption for Applied 
materials processed 
for a person or 
undertaking from a 
third country 
Amendment of the 
provisions of 
Chapter VI 
Never applied 
PROPOSED TEXT REMARKS 
Not mentioned <under the system None 
proposed, the exemption is for 
all materials> 
Provides for prior Commission 
approval to be required also 
for 'exports' of materials 
processed for persons or 
undertakings from a third 
country 
Provision is made for the 
amendment of the regulation 
establishing the conditions 
for the transfer of materials 
The new text is damaging 
because: 
- it would discourage clients 
from third countries 
- it would encourage the 
Member States to take 
initiatives outside the 
Community 
The regulation in question is ,: 
not known. 
It is dangerous that the 
regulation: 
• is to be adopted by the 
Commission <instead of the 
Council> 
• can be amended by a Council 
decision Cby a qualified 
majority instead of unani-
mously> 
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TEXT IN FORCE ~: . ' 
- PRACTICAL APPLICATION PROPOSED TEXT ';. .... ~ ..::::-.... .... REMARKS 
ARTICLE SUBJECT 
. can include derogations 
from the principle of 
market unity 
77 to 85 Safeguards Partially applied . Increases the bureaucratic load Fails to take account of 
(documentation, notification, developments in controls 
etc.) and creates additional 
controls which are redundant 
. Increases the scope for 
inspection controls 
I 
VI 
0 
I 
: 
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Chapter VI - Proposed revision - Summary analysis ANNEX I II 
---------------------------------------,-------------------------------,------------------------------~--------------------------
TEXT IN FORCE PRACTICAL APPLICATION PROPOSED TEXT 
Principle of non-discrimination Applied Unity of market (Art. 53) 
Right of option (Art. 52) Never applied in practice Abolished 
REMARKS 
• Risk of discrimination 
between countries with 
nuclear weapons and those 
without them CArt. 52> 
• Risk of derogations being 
introduced by means of 
amendments to the 
regulation (Art. 53> 
• Unorthodox procedure for 
issuing the regulation 
<issued by the Commission 
with possibility of appe~ 
to the Council) 
Risk of replacing the 
Agency's monopoly by a 
monopoly of the strongest 
countries 
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TEXT IN FORCE 
Exemption from provisions for materials 
processed for a person or undertaking 
from a third country (Art. 75) 
Prices policy <Articles 67 and 69) 
Incentives policy (Art. 70) 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Applied 
Never applied 
Applied sporadically 
PROPOSED TEXT 
No exemption (Art. 57> 
. 
. 
Rajority decision by the 
Council (Art. 61) 
Extended to activities in third 
countries <Art. 58> 
REMARKS 
• Increases Commission's 
power of intervention 
• Dissuades third country 
. 
clients from operating 
in the EEC 
• Provides an incentive for 
EEC industries to transfer 
their activities away from 
the Community 
• Risk of impromptu inter-
vention by the Council on 
prices and imports, 
affecting industrial 
strategies 
• Requests information which 
would undermine industrial 
confidentiality 
• Is vague about Community aid-
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TEXT IN FORCE 
Policy on stocks <Art. 72> 
Community controls <Arts. 77 and 85> 
Role of the Agency <Articles 53 and 56) 
I 
~ 
~ 
I 
PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Never implemented 
Only formal 
Some Member States have 
disregarded the rules 
PROPOSED TEXT 
Decentralization instead of 
centralization of stocks 
(Art. 60) 
Increased intervention 
<Articles 72 and 73) and 
heavier penalties <Article 74> 
. 
. 
'Academic' function of the 
Agency (Articles 65 and 71> 
REMARKS 
• As in the past, there are 
no guarantees concerning 
the building up of st~cks 
• ~rore onerous for users and 
made partly redundant by 
other Community and non-
Community controls 
• In some areas the Agency's 
power is reduced and that 
of the Commission extended. 
If applied, the new rules 
as a whole would place 
greater burdens and 
constraints on users. 
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